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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The District Court Erred In Vacating Pierce's Conviction 
A. Introduction 
The district court, on intermediate appeal, vacated the judgment of 
conviction entered upon the jury verdict finding Pierce guilty of violating a 
domestic violence protection order, I.C. § 39-6312, and reversed the magistrate's 
order denying Pierce's motion for judgment of acquittal. (R., pp.70-84.) Pierce's 
motion for an acquittal, and the district court's decision, were based on the 
assertion that the evidence was insufficient to support Pierce's conviction 
because the state did not prove that Pierce was guilty of the uncharged crime of 
disturbing the peace, I.C. § 18-6409. The state appealed, asserting the district 
court's conclusion in this regard is erroneous. 
In response, Pierce contends the district court "properly" reversed his 
conviction because the state "failed to provide evidence [that he] committed any 
enumerated act in I.C. § 18-6409." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Pierce also argues 
that dismissal was proper because, he asserts, "the civil protection order was 
unconstitutionally vague." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Both of Pierce's arguments 
fail. First, as noted in the state's opening brief, the state was not required to 
prove the uncharged crime of disturbing the peace in order to prove Pierce 
violated the domestic violation protection order under I.C. § 39-6312. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.3-9.) Second, this Court should decline to consider 
Pierce's constitutional argument because it is not preserved and Pierce has not 
established, or even attempted to establish, fundamental error. 
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The State Was Not Required To Prove A Violation Of LC. § 18-6409 In 
Order To Prove A Violation Of I.C. § 39-6312 
The district court erroneously decided that the evidence was insufficient 
because the state did not prove the elements of a crime it did not charge, i.e., 
disturbing the peace in violation of I.C. § 18-6409. (R., pp.70-84.) Pierce 
contends otherwise, arguing (1) that "[b]y including 'disturbed the peace' in the 
complaint, the State made it an absolute necessity for that phrase to be defined"; 
(2) the district court "properly relied on I. C. § 18-6409 to provide meaning to 
th[e] phrase" "disturbed the peace"; (3) "[t]he act of shutting off utilities is not 
included as an enumerated act" in I.C. § 18-6409; and (4) the elements 
instruction "went to the jury in a wholly incomprehensible format." 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-13.) None of these arguments demonstrate that 
Pierce was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the charged offense of violating 
a civil protection order, or any other relief. 
The majority of Pierce's arguments are irrelevant to the legal question of 
whether the evidence was sufficient, which question only requires an evaluation 
of whether there was substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997). 
That Pierce (and the district court) believes the jury was not properly instructed 
because it was not told the meaning of "disturbed the peace" or instructed on the 
elements of disturbing the peace, has no bearing on whether the evidence was 
sufficient to support Pierce's conviction. Pierce's other argument - that "shutting 
off utilities" is not an "enumerated act" in I.C. § 18-6409 - also fails because it is 
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based on the false premise that the state was required to prove any element of 
I. § 18-6409 as part proving a violation §39-631 the reasons 
already set forth in the Appellant's Brief, the state was not required to do so. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.3-11.) Pierce's argument to the contrary is without merit. 
C. Pierce's Constitutional Challenge Is Not Preserved And Should Not Be 
Considered 
Pierce argues in the alternative that "it was proper for the District Court to 
vacate the judgment in this case and enter an acquittal because the civil 
protection order was unconstitutionally vague." (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) This 
Court should decline to consider Pierce's alternative argument because it is not 
preserved. 
Absent a showing of fundamental error, "Idaho appellate courts have 
typically indicated that [they) will not consider the constitutionality of a statute[1] 
for the first time on appeal." State v. Key, 149 Idaho 691, 695, 239 P.3d 796, 800 
(2010). Pierce did not challenge the constitutionality of the civil protection order 
before the magistrate or the district court. (See generally R. (no motion to 
dismiss filed based on constitutional challenge); see generally Tr.; Appellant 
Brian Wade Pierce's Brief, p.3 (Issue: "Whether or not a court correctly denies a 
defendant's Motion for acquittal and enters judgment against a defendant when 
1 Assuming, arguendo, that Pierce's challenge to the constitutionality of the 
protection order could be considered under the same framework as a 
constitutional challenge to a statute, the same preservation standard would 
apply. 
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the State offered no evidence in support an essential element of a crime[.]") 
(augmentation).) Pierce implicitly acknowledges as much when he states "[t]his 
basis for dismissal isn't specifically argued by the District Court, but is 
nonetheless included because if I.C. § 18-6409 is not referenced to define 
'disturbing the peace,' than [sic] the phrase remains ambiguous." (Respondent's 
Brief, p.14.) Pierce's belief that "disturbing the peace" is an ambiguous phrase 
does not supplant his obligation to preserve a constitutional challenge to the 
protection order he violated. Moreover, the core of Pierce's argument is not a 
constitutional challenge, but is the same basic complaint he raises in relation to 
his quest for an acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence, which is his 
belief that the jury should have been instructed on disturbing the peace as 
codified at I.C. § 18-6409. This belief is incorrect. Further, even when viewed as 
a constitutional challenge, Pierce has made no attempt to show this claim should 
be considered under the rubric of fundamental error. Pierce's constitutional 
challenge is unpreserved and should not be considered, particularly since Pierce 
has failed to meet his burden of showing fundamental error. 
Because the district court erroneously concluded that Pierce was entitled 
to an acquittal on the charge that he violated I.C. § 39-6312 based on the state's 
failure to prove the uncharged crime of disturbing the peace, I.C. § 18-6409, the 
district court's Memorandum Decision should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
state respectfully requests that this 
Memorandum Decision. 
DATED this 23rd day of October, 2015. 
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